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oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/1301892026-01-20T13:31:40Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_15

Knowing how to establish intellectualism Sgaravatti, Daniele Zardini, Elia 1 165 Filosofía Teoría del conocimiento 72 Filosofía 7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento Earlier versions of the material in this paper were given in 2007 at the UCLA Epistemology Workshop and at the Arché Knowledge and Language Seminar (University of St Andrews); in 2008, at the Arché Reading Party in Carbost (University of St Andrews) and at a research seminar at the University of Göttingen. Online publication date: 12 Aug 2008 In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowl-edge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of ‘know how’-and ‘know wh’-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to ‘know wh’-ascriptions, ‘know how’-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge- that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion. Depto. de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica Fac. de Filosofía TRUE pub 2026-01-14T12:21:57Z 2026-01-14T12:21:57Z 2008 journal article VoR https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/130189 0165-9227 1875-6735 eng Sgaravatti, D. y Zardini, E. (2008) «Knowing how to establish intellectualism», Grazer Philosophische Studien, 77(1), pp. 217-261. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000849. restricted access application/pdf Brill