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Palmira, Michele 2026-02-06T12:59:01Z 2026-02-06T12:59:01Z 2023 Palmira, M. (2023) «Rational Hypothesis: Inquiry Direction Without Evidence», Philosophical Topics, 51(2), pp. 197-219. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.5840/PHILTOPICS202351223. 0276-2080 10.5840/philtopics202351223 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131824 2154-154X https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202351223 https://www.uapress.com/philosophical-topics-journal/ https://www.jstor.org/stable/48822836 https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/6869741384fff30d95b14fb3 There are scenarios in which letting one’s own views on the question whether p direct one’s inquiry into that question brings about individual and collective epistemic benefits. However, these scenarios are also such that one’s evidence doesn’t support believing one’s own views. So, how to vindicate the epistemic benefits of directing one’s inquiry in such an asymmetric way, without asking one to hold a seemingly irrational doxastic attitude? To answer this question, the paper understands asymmetric inquiry direction in terms of having one’s inquiry be guided by a doxastic attitude, which I call hypothesis, that’s governed by the following norm: One’s hypothesis that p is rational just in case it is a manifestation of the best feasible way to form a doxastic attitude regarding p that promotes the best feasible ways to advance towards settling the question of p’s (or of any other suitably related proposition’s) truth-value. eng restricted access Rational hypothesis: inquiry direction without evidence journal article