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Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check Palmira, Michele 165 Higher-order evidence Double check Zetetic Teoría del conocimiento 7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento Issue Online: 15 August 2024 ; Version of Record online: 25 September 2023. El trabajo en este artículo ha recibido financiación de la Ayuda para contratos Ramón y Cajal (RYC2018-024624-I). The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher-order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double-checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher-order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which appeals to the notion of defeat. European Commission Universidad Complutense de Madrid Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (España) Depto. de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica Fac. de Filosofía TRUE pub 2026-02-10T08:26:52Z 2026-02-10T08:26:52Z 2024 journal article VoR https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131988 0029-4624 10.1111/nous.12479 1468-0068 eng info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICIU//PID2021-123938NB-I00/ES/LA NATURALEZA Y NORMATIVIDAD DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN/NANORIN Palmira, M. (2024). Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check. Noûs, 58(3), 799-824. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12479 restricted access application/pdf Wiley