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Davia, Cory Palmira, Michele 2026-02-10T09:58:19Z 2026-02-10T09:58:19Z 2015 Davia, C., & Palmira, M. (2015). Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer. The Philosophical Quarterly, 65(261), 605-625. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv014 0031-8094 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/132007 1467-9213 https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv014 https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-abstract/65/261/605/1505308 https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/61fa8afc565bff40e6e7c327 Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result. eng restricted access Moral deference and deference to an epistemic peer journal article