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Martín Villuendas, Mariano 2026-02-24T11:24:14Z 2026-02-24T11:24:14Z 2025 Martín-Villuendas, M. Scientific Understanding: No Veritism Without Realism, No Realism Without Veritism. Acta Anal (2025). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5 0353-5150 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/133025 1874-6349 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5 https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-025-00643-5 https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/698ae3869e41074a91302dc1 Scientific understanding constitutes one of the most firmly settled topics in the philosophy of general science. The most accepted approach within the debate has been the so-called “factivism of understanding.” Here, I show analytically how the latter is articulated through the acceptance of two interrelated theses: an epistemological—veritism—and an ontological one—realism. Recently, a group of authors challenged this line of thought by dissociating ontological and epistemological commitments. I examine these proposals, elucidating to what extent they fail in their attempt to formulate a consistent account of scientific understanding. I argue that if one wants to articulate an account committed to a truth-centered epistemology, one should adopt a realist stance; if one wants to formulate a realist account of scientific understanding, one should subscribe to a truth-centered epistemology. eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ open access Attribution 4.0 International Scientific understanding: no veritism without realism, no realism without veritism journal article