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oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/1341012026-03-19T01:00:52Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_15

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Theilen, Bernd author Tomori, Françeska author 2023-07-04 We compare two regulatory structures in the application of emission standards and a subsidy scheme in the automobile market. The regulator can either commit to an emission standard or is not able to commit. Firms compete á la Cournot and produce fuel-powered and electric vehicles. The emissions of fuel-powered vehicles can be abated by means of investing in emission-reducing innovation. Our results indicate that under commitment there are less emissions, higher subsidies and a major adoption of electric vehicles. By contrast, non-commitment yields more fuel-powered vehicles, more vehicles in total and higher consumer surplus. Electric vehicle producers obtain higher profits under commitment, whereas fuel-powered vehicle producers might be better off under both regulatory structures. Social welfare is higher under non-commitment as long as environmental damages are regarded severe. Otherwise, commitment is socially preferable. This result provides an explanation for observed differences in the duration of environmental standards between the US, the EU and China. Theilen, B., & Tomori, F. (2023). Regulatory commitment versus non-commitment: Electric vehicle adoption under subsidies and emission standards. Resource and Energy Economics, 74, 101388. 0928-7655 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2023.101388 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134101 1873-0221 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2023.101388 Regulatory commitment versus non-commitment: electric vehicle adoption under subsidies and emission standards