2026-06-29T02:51:03Zhttps://docta.ucm.es/rest/oai/request

oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/1341332026-03-20T00:59:56Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_15

Market power in California's water market Tomori, Françeska Ansink, Erik Houba, Harold Hagerty, Nick Bos, Charles We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited. 2026-03-19T09:20:14Z 2026-03-19T09:20:14Z 2026-03-19T09:20:14Z 2023-10-28 journal article https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134133 0002-9092 10.1111/ajae.12434 1467-8276 eng info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2019-105982GB-I00/ES/REGLAS FISCALES Y REGULATORIAS PARA UN DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE/ info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/BES-2017-080192/ES/DISEÑO DE INSTITUTIONES ECONOMICAS EN UNA ECONOMIA GLOBAL/ 2019PFR-URV-53 Tomori, Françeska, Ansink, Erik, Houba, Harold, Hagerty, Nick, and Bos, Charles. 2024. “Market Power in California's Water Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 106(3): 1274–1299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ open access Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Wiley