2026-06-07T05:29:15Zhttps://docta.ucm.es/rest/oai/request

oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/1365612026-05-07T00:00:49Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_15

The Stackelberg–Armstrong model Sánchez Cartas, Juan Manuel We show that sequential (Stackelberg) competition between two-sided platforms can overturn the price-skewness ranking of the Armstrong (2006) competition benchmark: the side subsidized under simultaneous pricing may become the taxed side under sequential play. The mechanism is that the Stackelberg leader internalizes cross-side feedback through the follower’s best response, which introduces both externalities into each side’s markup and can reverse which side is subsidized. The equilibrium is unique, admits closed-form solutions under standard interiority/concavity conditions, and is directly comparable to Armstrong’s benchmark. Both platforms earn strictly more than under simultaneous play, and we characterize a sharp threshold separating second-mover from first-mover advantage. 2026-05-06T12:47:01Z 2026-05-06T12:47:01Z 2026 journal article Sanchez-Cartas, J. M. (2026). The stackelberg–armstrong model. Economics Letters, 265, 113019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113019 0165-1765 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113019 https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/136561 1873-7374 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2026.113019 eng http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ open access Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Elsevier