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On single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo Strategy-Proofness Single-Peaked Preferences Preferences over Sets of Alternatives Minimally Extended Social Choice Functions. Teoría de Juegos Microeconomía 1207.06 Teoría de Juegos 5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica We extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) Depto. de Análisis Económico y Economía Cuantitativa Fac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales TRUE pub 2023-06-17T22:46:42Z 2023-06-17T22:46:42Z 2017 journal article https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/18852 1545-2921 eng ECO2016-76818-C3-3-P open access application/pdf Economics Bulletin