2026-06-28T20:11:27Zhttps://docta.ucm.es/rest/oai/requestoai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/188542025-02-14T16:59:42Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_15
Docta Complutense
author
André García, Francisco Javier
author
De Castro Lejarriaga, Luis Miguel
2023-06-17T22:46:50Z
2023-06-17T22:46:50Z
2017
1464-3812
10.1093/oep/gpw073
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/18854
https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpw073
Prior research has shown that environmental policy can create scarcity rents. We analyse this phenomenon in the framework of a duopoly that faces a carbon price, considering both Cournot and Stackelberg competition. We identify the different sources of scarcity rents, which we classify in ‘output’ and ‘grandfathering’ scarcity rents. The former depend on the elasticity of the rivals’ output to the carbon price, while the latter is exogenous. We also determine under which conditions these rents can be large enough to increase firms’ profits and, as a policy implication, to what extent the existence of scarcity rents can make the firms agree on a tougher policy. This event is more likely to happen under Cournot than under Stackelberg competition, and the chances increase if the firms are allowed to pollute a large amount without paying a price.
eng
Scarcity climate rents under a carbon price with oligopoly competition
journal article
URL
https://docta.ucm.es/bitstreams/e8ec4810-d596-42d0-b6c7-85e2849cc3c7/download
File
MD5
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313696
application/pdf
André-Scarcity Climate Rents (Postprint).pdf
URL
https://docta.ucm.es/bitstreams/6de542af-0cca-42c0-9a3a-dac323f3c347/download
File
MD5
8a5e35761e5f0ebd4c8af04bda7f13af
76809
text/plain
André-Scarcity Climate Rents (Postprint).pdf.txt