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   <dc:title>Systemic banks, capital composition and CoCo bonds issuance: The effects on bank risk</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Echevarría Icaza, Victor</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Sosvilla Rivero, Simón Javier</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>G12</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>G21</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>G28</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Contingent capital</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Banking regulation</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Risk-taking incentives</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Asset substitution</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Systemic risk</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Bancos y cajas</dc:subject>
   <dc:description>This paper shows that systemic banks are prone to increase their regulatory capital ratio through a decline in risk-weighted assets density and an intense use of lower level capital. The market access of systemic banks, and the fact that they were singled out for higher capital requirements seem to have biased them towards lower level capital, consistent with the theory that asymmetric information drives capital decisions. These effects are particularly strong for institutions that had a rather low level of capitalization at the start of the period and for those that exhibited a strong use of Additional Tier I capital before the regulatory changes. Strict capital composition requirements for firms with lower buffers would be an improvement.</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Banco de España through grant from Programa de Ayudas a la Investigación 2016–2017 en Macroeconomía, Economía Monetaria, Financiera y Bancaria e Historia Económica</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport [grant PRX16/00261]</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [grant ECO2016-76203-C2-2-P]</dc:description>
   <dc:description>Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI)
</dc:description>
   <dc:description>TRUE</dc:description>
   <dc:description>pub</dc:description>
   <dc:date>2023-06-18T05:38:24Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2023-06-18T05:38:24Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2017</dc:date>
   <dc:type>technical report</dc:type>
   <dc:type>VoR</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/22900</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>2530-0849</dc:identifier>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   <dc:relation>Working Papers</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>Atribución-NoComercial 3.0 España</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/es/</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>open access</dc:rights>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
   <dc:publisher>Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales (ICEI)</dc:publisher>
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