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oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/489562023-11-14T07:20:58Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_17

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Camiña Centeno, Ester author 2010-12 We consider a general class of two-sided matching markets, called many-to-one matching markets with money. For a special case of these markets, where each seller owns di¤erent objects, we prove that stable outcomes cannot be characterized by the non-existence of unsatis…ed pairs. Moreover, we restore the dual lattice structure in markets with more than one seller using a connection with an assignment game. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/48956 https://www.ucm.es/icae Some results on stability concepts for matching models