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A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility Corchón, Luis C. Lindahl equilibria Nash equilibrium Macroeconomía Teorías económicas 5307.14 Teoría Macroeconómica 5307 Teoría Económica We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with some general comments about the nature of the incentive problem. Decanato Fac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales TRUE pub 2023-06-21T01:31:24Z 2023-06-21T01:31:24Z 1988 technical report https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/63872 2255-5471 eng Documentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/ open access application/pdf Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato