2026-06-27T15:27:24Zhttps://docta.ucm.es/rest/oai/requestoai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/715612024-02-28T16:00:46Zcom_20.500.14352_14col_20.500.14352_15
Docta Complutense
author
Castro Cantalejo, Javier
author
Espínola Vílchez, María Rosario
author
Gutiérrez García-Pardo, Inmaculada
author
Gómez González, Daniel
2023-06-22T10:44:32Z
2023-06-22T10:44:32Z
2022-04-03
0927-7099
10.1007/s10614-022-10259-1
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/71561
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-022-10259-1
In this paper we define a new auction, called the Draw auction. It is based on the implementation of a draw when a minimum price of sale is not reached. We find that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium is reached in the Draw auction when each player bids his true personal valuation of the object. Furthermore, we show that the expected profit for the seller in the Draw auction is greater than in second-price auctions, with or without minimum price of sale. We make this affirmation for objects whose valuation can be modeled as a bimodal density function in which the first mode is much greater than the second one. Regarding the Myerson auction, we show that the expected profit for the seller in the Draw auction is nearly as good as the expected profit in the optimal auction, with the difference that our method is much more simple to implement than Myerson’s one. All these results are shown by computational tests, for whose development we have defined an algorithm to calculate Myerson auction.
eng
Atribución 3.0 España
Auctions: A New Method for Selling Objects with Bimodal Density Functions
journal article
URL
https://docta.ucm.es/bitstreams/0f0a27f0-2a4a-4d55-a24b-c5c9baf1807c/download
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1161924
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Castro2022_Article_AuctionsANewMethodForSellingOb.pdf