González Castán, Óscar Lucas2023-06-162023-06-162021-07-19González-Castán, Ó. L. (2022). “Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems”. Acta Analytica 37, pp. 283-300.0353-515010.1007/s12136-021-00473-1https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/4637CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2021)In this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problemsjournal articlehttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12136-021-00473-1open accessMental statesScepticismAntinomyPsychophysical covariationsPartial sensitivityMeta-knowledgeFilosofía de la menteHumanidadesFilosofíaTeoría del conocimiento11 Lógica72 Filosofía7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento7201.02 Epistemología7202.03 Problema Alma-Cuerpo7202.05 Filosofía de la Imaginación