Sebastián Gascón, Miguel2023-06-212023-06-2119872255-5471https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/65976This paper presents a model which in a world with fixed exchange rates and absence of capital controls non-cooperative game yield multiple Nash equilibria with nonoptimal allocations, when we introduce regimes as strategies for the players. In general there is a unique Perfect Equilibrium for the game with both strategies. The sub-optimality of the non-cooperative solution provides scope for international coordination, in the form of joint choice of non-inflationary polices that dominate the Nash equilibria allocations.engAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 Españahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/technical reporthttp://economicasyempresariales.ucm.es/working-papers-cceehttps://economicasyempresariales.ucm.es/working-papers-cceeopen accessTipos de cambio fijosPolíticas monetarias no cooperativasNashFixer exchange ratesMonetary policies non-coperativeCooperación económica