García Carril Puy, NemesioSambrotta, Mirco2025-12-012025-12-012025Puy, Nemesio G. C. 2025. Triviality, inconsistency and solipsism: three problems in the metaontology of art and a Goodmanian solution. In M. Sambrotta (ed.), Metaphysics Today: in Conversation with Amie Thomasson. Springer.978-3-031-98467-9978-3-031-98470-9978-3-031-98468-610.1007/978-3-031-98468-6_4https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/127392Esta publicación forma parte de la subvención RYC2021-032014-I, financiada por Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España) y la Unión Europea «NextGenerationEU»/PRTR. Una versión previa de este artículo se presentó en el XXVIII Taller Interuniversitario sobre Filosofía y Ciencias Cognitivas de la Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (Universidad de Granada, 2019).Amie Thomasson’s descriptivism and Julian Dodd’s revisionism are two outstanding opposed views within the methodological debate in the metaontology of art. In this paper, I argue that none of them provide an adequate methodology for the ontology of artworks insofar as they do not secure ontological accounts to play a substantive role in improving our understanding of artworks and the practices they involve. Thomasson’s descriptivism faces a problem of triviality, unjustifiably reducing art ontology to a trivial task. In turn, Dodd’s revisionary approach faces a problem of solipsism, being a methodology that does not ensure conceptual mediation between the ontology of art and artistic practices. Finally, I will sketch a solution for both problems based on Nelson Goodman’s distinction between entrenchment and familiarity of a predicate.engbook parthttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-98468-6_4https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-98468-6_4https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/68fbc14ccfac080530b9180drestricted access7.01111MetaontologyOntology of artDescriptivismRevisionismSubstantivityEstética (Filosofía)Metafísica7202.01 Estética7203.03 Metafísica, Ontología