Palmira, Michele2026-02-102026-02-102024Palmira, M. (2024). Higher‐order evidence and the duty to double‐check. Noûs, 58(3), 799-824. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.124790029-462410.1111/nous.12479https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131988Issue Online: 15 August 2024 ; Version of Record online: 25 September 2023. El trabajo en este artículo ha recibido financiación de la Ayuda para contratos Ramón y Cajal (RYC2018-024624-I).The paper proposes an account of the rational response to higher-order evidence whose key claim is that whenever we acquire such evidence we ought to engage in the inquiring activity of double-checking. Combined with a principle that establishes a connection between rational inquiry and rational belief retention, the account offers a novel explanation of the alleged impermissibility of retaining one's belief in the face of higher-order evidence. It is argued that this explanation is superior to the main competitor view which appeals to the notion of defeat.engjournal article1468-0068https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12479https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nous.12479https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/652b292aebee473633a36cbcrestricted access165Higher-order evidenceDouble checkZeteticTeoría del conocimiento7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento