González Castán, Óscar Lucas2024-05-142024-05-142014-09-14González-Castán, Óscar L (2014). “Overcoming Positivism: Husserl and Wittgenstein”, Phänomenologische Forschungen, Jahrbuch 2014, Felix Meiner, pp. 13-58.0342-811710.28937/1000107776https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103978Este artículo fue escrito gracias al apoyo del Grupo de Investigación de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid GR35/10AIn this paper I shall briefly analyze Husserl´s and Wittgenstein´s divergent reactions against the positivist stance on natural science and on the new cultural role that philosophy should play in relation to science. To a great extent, their philosophies can be considered as a departure from positivism, although for quite different reasons. I shall argue that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, took positivism as a starting point that he tried to overcome from within. This endeavour led him to defend some theses of a pragmatist flavour as well as a peculiar type of radical agnosticism on ontological and epistemological issues. Husserl, however, considered that positivism was a dead-end for philosophy. Positivism has beheaded philosophy as a consequence of advancing a reductive view of science. Phenomenology is the attempt to understand the genetic and subjective processes that have ended up in an objective and scientific image of the world.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/journal article2567-5494https://doi.org/10.28937/1000107776https://meiner.de/phanomenologische-forschungen-2014-13358.htmlhttps://meiner.de/catalog/product/view/id/13496/s/overcoming-positivism-husserl-and-wittgenstein/category/1206/?previd=13358open access165.2165.32ScienceTruthRadical agnosticismModelsLanguage grammarHistoricismIdealityHumanidadesFilosofíaTeoría del conocimiento72 Filosofía7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento7201.02 Epistemología7205 Filosofía de la Ciencia