Palmira, Michele2026-02-092026-02-092015Michele Palmira (2015). HOW TO CONDORCET A GOLDMAN. Episteme, 12, pp 413-425 doi:10.1017/epi.2015.281742-360010.1017/epi.2015.28https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131891Published online: 03 July 2015.In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.engjournal article1750-0117https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.28https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/episteme/article/how-to-condorcet-a-goldman/AF3EF59364C479F2685E768C215B8E4Dhttps://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/61fa8afc565bff40e6e7c321restricted access165CondorcetCondorcet's jury theoremAlvin I. GoldmanTeoría del conocimiento7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento