Zardini, Elia2026-02-032026-02-032017Zardini, E. (2017) «K ⊈ E», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94(3), pp. 540-557. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPR.12365.0031-820510.1111/phpr.12365https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131418At different stages during the writing of the paper, I’ve benefitted from an AHRC Postdoctoral Research Fellowship, from the FP7 Marie Curie Intra-European Research Fellowship 301493 on A Non-Contractive Theory of Naive Semantic Properties: Logical Developments and Metaphysical Foundations (NTNSP) and from the FCT Research Fellowship IF/01202/2013 on Tolerance and Instability: The Substructure of Cognitions, Transitions and Collections (TI). as well as from partial funds from the project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 CSD2009-00056 of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation on Philosophy of Perspectival Thoughts and Facts (PERSP), from the FP7 Marie Curie Initial Training Network 238128 on Perspectival Thoughts and Facts (PETAF).In a series of very influential works, Tim Williamson has advanced and defended a much discussed theory of evidence containing, among other claims, the thesis that, if one knows P, P is part of one’s evidence (K ⊆ E). I argue that K ⊆ E is false, and indeed that it is so for a reason that Williamson himself essentially provides in arguing against the thesis that, if one has a justified true belief in P, P is part of one’s evidence: together with a very plausible principle governing the acquisition of knowledge by nondeductive inference based on evidence, K ⊆ E leads, in a sorites-like fashion, to what would seem a series of unacceptably bootstrapping expansions of one’s evidence. I then develop some considerations about the functions of and conditions for evidence which are suggested by the argument against K ⊆ E. I close by discussing the relationship of the argument with anti-closure arguments of the style exemplified by the preface paradox: I contend that, if closure is assumed, it is extremely plausible to expect that the diagnosis of what goes wrong in the preface-paradox-style argument cannot be used to block my own argument.engjournal article1933-1592https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12365https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phpr.12365https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/61fa8a54565bff40e6e7b736restricted access165KnowledgeEvidenceFilosofíaTeoría del conocimiento72 Filosofía7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento7201.02 Epistemología