Tomori, FrançeskaAnsink, ErikHouba, HaroldHagerty, NickBos, Charles2026-03-192026-03-192023-10-28Tomori, Françeska, Ansink, Erik, Houba, Harold, Hagerty, Nick, and Bos, Charles. 2024. “Market Power in California's Water Market.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 106(3): 1274–1299. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.124340002-909210.1111/ajae.12434https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/134133We estimate market power in California's surface water market. Market power may distort the potential welfare gains from water marketing. We use a Nash-Cournot model and derive a closed-form solution for the extent of market power in a water market setting. We then use this solution to estimate market power in a newly assembled dataset on California's water economy. We show that, under the assumptions of the Nash-Cournot model, market power in this thin market is limited.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/journal article1467-8276https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12434open accessC72D43Q25CaliforniaMarket powerNash-CournotWater marketsEconomíaEconometría (Economía)Economía públicaEconomía industrial5307 Teoría Económica5302.02 Modelos Econométricos5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica