Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo2024-05-082024-05-082023-11Rodríguez-Álvarez, C. (2023). Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange. Mathematical Social Sciences, 126, 107-118. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.00410.1016/j.mathsocsci.2023.10.004https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811This paper greatly benefited from thorough and exhaustive comments of two anonymous referees and the Associate Editor, and from suggestions and discussions with Alexander Karpov, Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò, and Antonio Romero-Medina. Financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces and Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Proyectos ECO2016-76818, PID2019-107161GB-C32, PID2020-118022GB-I00) is gratefully acknowledged.We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/journal articlehttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489623000860open accessC71C78D71D78Pairwise exchangeIndividual rationalityConstrained efficiencyStrategy-proofnessMaximal domainEconometría (Economía)5302 Econometría