Menéndez Menéndez, Agustín JoséWilkinson, Michael AGoldoni, Marco2024-01-302024-01-302023Menéndez, Agustín José. 2023. “The ‘Terrible’ Functional Constitution of the European Union: ‘Sound’ Money, Economic Freedom(s) and ‘Free’ Competition.” In The Cambridge Handbook on the Material Constitution, Cambridge Law Handbooks, eds. Marco Goldoni and Michael A. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. chapter, 351–66978-1-316-51946-210.1017/9781009023764.029https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/96324This chapter reconstructs the content of the three principles that play a key role in the constitution and the disciplining of public power in the European Union: ’sound money’, economic freedoms(s) and ’free’ competition. Such a trio is the fundamental parameter of the validity of all national norms, at the same time that the division of labour between supranational decision-making processes favours their reflection in European legislation, while constituting a major obstacle to efforts at approving regulations and directives promoting alternative socio-economic visions. The fundamental norms of the European Union also include norms and practices that shift decision-making powers from the supranational legislature to (some) private actors, (some) technocrats and (some) national governments. The result is the affirmation of private property as the sovereign value of European law, which requires that supranational public power becomes a powerful external constraint that once and at the same time constitutes, disciplines and fragments (national) public power.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/book parthttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009023764.029restricted access340.12Derecho europeoCapitalismoLibertades económicasPolítica monetariaDemocracia representativaEpistocraciaFilosofía del DerechoFilosofía política5602.03 Filosofía del Derecho7207.04 Filosofía Política