André García, Francisco JavierMazón Calpena, CristinaÁlvarez González, Francisco2024-01-122024-01-122019Alvarez, Francisco, Cristina Mazón, y Francisco Javier André. «Assigning Pollution Permits: Are Uniform Auctions Efficient?» Economic Theory 67, n.o 1 (febrero de 2019): 211-48. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1.0938-225910.1007/s00199-017-1089-1https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/92704We study the efficiency of the uniform auction as an allocation mechanism for emission permits among polluting firms. In our model, firms have private information about their abatement costs, which differ across firms and across units, and bidders’ demands are linear. We show that there is a continuum of interior Bayesian Nash equilibria, and only one is efficient, minimizing abatement costs. We find that the existence of many bidders is not a sufficient condition to guarantee an efficient equilibrium in the uniform auction. Additionally, bidders’ types have to be uncorrelated.engAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/journal article1432-0479https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-017-1089-1open accessD44D61Emission permitsUniform auctionEfficiencyIncomplete information simultaneous gamesTeorías económicasEmpresasMedio ambiente5307.15 Teoría Microeconómica5902.08 Política del Medio Ambiente