Sgaravatti, DanieleZardini, Elia2026-01-142026-01-142008Sgaravatti, D. y Zardini, E. (2008) «Knowing how to establish intellectualism», Grazer Philosophische Studien, 77(1), pp. 217-261. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000849.0165-9227https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/130189Earlier versions of the material in this paper were given in 2007 at the UCLA Epistemology Workshop and at the Arché Knowledge and Language Seminar (University of St Andrews); in 2008, at the Arché Reading Party in Carbost (University of St Andrews) and at a research seminar at the University of Göttingen. Online publication date: 12 Aug 2008In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowl-edge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of ‘know how’-and ‘know wh’-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to ‘know wh’-ascriptions, ‘know how’-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure principles whose counterparts fail for knowledge-wh and knowledge- that. Thirdly, as opposed to knowledge-wh and knowledge-that, knowledge-how is inferentially isolated from further knowledge-that. We close by providing some evidence against the further reduction of knowledge-wh to knowledge-that, which is presupposed by the intellectualist theory under discussion.engjournal article1875-6735https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000849https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/695f8260ee6cd0098b6170ccrestricted access1165FilosofíaTeoría del conocimiento72 Filosofía7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento