Zardini, Elia2026-02-032026-02-032013Zardini, E. Naive Modus Ponens . J Philos Logic 42, 575–593 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9239-10022-361110.1007/s10992-012-9239-1https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/131438In writing it, I have benefitted, at different stages, from a UNAM Postdoctoral Research Fellowship and an AHRC Postdoctoral Research Fellowship.The paper is concerned with a logical difficulty which Lionel Shapiro’s deflationist theory of logical consequence (as well as the author’s favoured, non-deflationist theory) gives rise to. It is argued that Shapiro’s noncontractive approach to solving the difficulty, although correct in its broad outlines, is nevertheless extremely problematic in some of its specifics, in particular in its failure to validate certain intuitive rules and laws associated with the principle of modus ponens. An alternative non-contractive theory is offered which does not suffer from the same problem. Received 10 May 2011 ; Accepted 12 June 2012 ; Published 12 July 2012.engjournal article1573-0433https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9239-1https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10992-012-9239-1https://produccioncientifica.ucm.es/documentos/61fa8a56565bff40e6e7b75drestricted access16ContractionCurry’s paradoxEntailmentLogical consequenceModus ponensTransparent truthLógica (Filosofía)11 Lógica