Turrado García, FernandoSandoval Orozco, Ana LucilaGarcía Pineda, M. PilarGarcía Villalba, Luis Javier2023-06-222023-06-222022-11-240957-417410.1016/j.eswa.2022.119340https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/72823CRUE-CSIC (Acuerdos Transformativos 2022)The principal–agent problem occurs when one entity (the ‘‘agent’’), is able to make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of another person or entity (the ‘‘principal’’). The agent earnings are regulated under a contract designed by the principal. Under the principal’s point of view, the main goal while designing said contract (and the payment rules incorporated on it) is to align the actions made by the agent to the principal’s own goals. So, in this paper we will define a method that will allow the principal to forecast the remuneration obtained by the agent under an established contract in the insurance sector.engAtribución 3.0 EspañaAgency theory: Forecasting agent remuneration at insurance companiesjournal articlehttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2022.119340open accessAgent theoryOptimal contractSupervised learningSupport vector machinesMontecarlo methodsInteligencia artificial (Informática)1203.04 Inteligencia Artificial