García Viñuela, EnriqueJurado, IgnacioRiera, Pedro2023-06-182023-06-182016-031743-961210.1080/13608746.2016.1154709https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23654We would like to thank the two reviewers of this article, Joaquín Artés, Alfonso Echazarra, Sandra León y Rubén Ruiz-Rufino for their extremely detailed and useful comments. We would also like to acknowledge the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for its financial support through the project ‘Comportamiento electoral y políticas públicas’ [Reference: CSO2013-40870-R].This paper analyses which districts are targeted by Spanish political parties in their electoral campaigns. We find that the major Spanish parties - PP and PSOE - mobilise districts where they are more likely to win a new seat or are in danger of losing one they already hold. The predicted closeness of the district race is more relevant in the smallest districts. We also find that Spanish parties mobilise their strongholds. We suggest that, apart from the pure office-seeking strategies, political finance motivations might also play a role in the mobilisation choices made by Spanish party elites.engjournal articlehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2016.1154709open accessElection campaignsProportional representation systemsSwing and core districtsPPPSOE.EleccionesPartidos y grupos políticos5905.01 Elecciones5905.06 Partidos Políticos