Person:
Molina Ferragut, Elisenda

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First Name
Elisenda
Last Name
Molina Ferragut
Affiliation
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Matemáticas
Department
Estadística e Investigación Operativa
Area
Estadística e Investigación Operativa
Identifiers
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Search Results

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
  • Item
    The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus
    (International Journal of Game Theory, 2000) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
    This short note proves that the least square nucleolus (Ruiz et al. (1996)) and the lexicographical solution (Sakawa and Nishizaki (1994)) select the same imputation in each game with nonempty imputation set. As a consequence the least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus (Maschier et al. (1992)).
  • Item
    Linear production games with committee control: Limiting behaviour of the core
    (European journal of operational research, 2004) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
    We study the relation between the core of a given controlled committee LP-game and the set of payoff vectors generated by shadow prices and core allocations of those simple games describing the control over the different resources. The central problem we tackle is the convergence of the core of LP-games with committee control to the set of competitive equilibria, which we define as the set previously described, as the number of players increases uniformly.
  • Item
    Linear production games with fuzzy control
    (Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2006) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
    The aim of this paper is to analyse linear production with committee control situations arising when controllers face the possibility of graduating their options. In order to model these situations, we consider several kinds of fuzzy controls, which can be modelled as different simple fuzzy games. An LP-game which is an extension of LP-games with committee control introduced in Curiel et al. [on balanced games and games with committee control, OR Spectrum 11 (1989) 83-88] is obtained and its core is studied.