Person: Molina Ferragut, Elisenda
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First Name
Elisenda
Last Name
Molina Ferragut
Affiliation
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Matemáticas
Department
EstadÃstica e Investigación Operativa
Area
EstadÃstica e Investigación Operativa
Identifiers
9 results
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Now showing 1 - 9 of 9
Item The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus(International Journal of Game Theory, 2000) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioThis short note proves that the least square nucleolus (Ruiz et al. (1996)) and the lexicographical solution (Sakawa and Nishizaki (1994)) select the same imputation in each game with nonempty imputation set. As a consequence the least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus (Maschier et al. (1992)).Item The position value as a centrality measure in social networks(2023) Lopez, Susana; Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Saboyá, Martha; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioThe position value, introduced by Meessen (1988), is a solution concept for cooperative games in which the value assigned to a player depends on the value of the connections or links he has with other players. This concept has been studied by Borm et al. (1992) and characterised by Slikker (2005). In this paper, we analyse the position value from the point of view of the typical properties of a measure of centrality in a social network. We extend the analysis already developed in Gomez et al. (2003) for the Myerson centrality measure, where the symmetric effect on the centralities of the end nodes of an added or removed edge is a fundamental part of its characterisation. However, the Position centrality measure, unlike the Myerson centrality measure, responds in a more versatile way to such addition or elimination. After studying the aforementioned properties, we will focus on the analysis and characterisation of the Position attachment centrality given by the position value when the underlying game is the attachment game. Some comparisons are made with the attachment centrality introduced by Skibski et al. (2019).Item Assessment of groups in a network organization based on the Shapley group value.(Decision Support Systems, 2016) Flores, Ramón; Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioThe focus of this paper is the assessment of groups of agents or units in a network organization. Given a social network, the relations between agents are modeled by means of a graph, and its functionality will be codified by means of a cooperative game. Building on previous work of Gomez et al. (2003) for the individual case, we propose a Myerson group value to evaluate the ability of each group of agents inside the social network to achieve the organization's goals. We analyze this centrality measure, and in particular we offer several decompositions that facilitate obtaining a precise interpretation of it.Item Some game theoretic marketing attribution models(Annals of Operations Research, 2022) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio; Weiss, TomIn this paper, we propose and analyse two game theoretic approaches to design attribution mechanisms for multi-channel marketing campaigns. Both approaches are based on a key performance index function that provides the benefit obtained in each of the observed paths to conversion. The first approach considers the problem as a cooperative transferable utility game, and the proposed attribution mechanisms are based on the Shapley value. The second approach models the problem as a bankruptcy problem and the proposed attribution mechanism is based on the constrained equal-losses rule. We also extend the above approaches to deal with the cases in which the position or the repetition of the channels on the paths to conversion are taken into account.Item Linear production games with committee control: Limiting behaviour of the core(European journal of operational research, 2004) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioWe study the relation between the core of a given controlled committee LP-game and the set of payoff vectors generated by shadow prices and core allocations of those simple games describing the control over the different resources. The central problem we tackle is the convergence of the core of LP-games with committee control to the set of competitive equilibria, which we define as the set previously described, as the number of players increases uniformly.Item Imputación de costes y beneficios : aportaciones desde la teorÃa de juegos cooperativos(2003) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioEn esta memoria se estudian algunos aspectos del problema general de cómo repartir el beneficio que se ha generado o el coste en que se ha incurrido cuando un grupo de agentes participa conjuntamente en la producción o el consumo de un bien. Dicho estudio se aborda desde el punto de vista que ofrece la TeorÃa de Juegos Cooperativos con utilidad transferible. Concretamente, se analizan tres problemas de la economÃa teórica: el problema de asignación de costes conjuntos de producción de bienes heterogéneos (capÃtulo 2), el problema de repartir el beneficio que se ha generado con la venta en el mercado de una serie de productos elaborados, mediante un proceso de producción lineal, a partir de recursos controlados por comités de agentes (capÃtulo 3) y el problema de cómo distribuir el coste de mantenimiento de una red de suministros entre sus usuarios (capÃtulo 4)Item Linear production games with fuzzy control(Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2006) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioThe aim of this paper is to analyse linear production with committee control situations arising when controllers face the possibility of graduating their options. In order to model these situations, we consider several kinds of fuzzy controls, which can be modelled as different simple fuzzy games. An LP-game which is an extension of LP-games with committee control introduced in Curiel et al. [on balanced games and games with committee control, OR Spectrum 11 (1989) 83-88] is obtained and its core is studied.Item The equalizer and the lexicographical solutions for cooperative fuzzy games: characterization and properties(Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2002) Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan AntonioIn this paper we analyze the lexicographical solution for fuzzy TU games, we study its properties and obtain a characterization. The lexicographical solution was introduced by Sakawa and Nishizaki (Fuzzy Sets and Systems 61 (1994) 265-275) as a solution for crisp TU games, and then extended as a value for fuzzy TU games. We approach the problem by means of the close relationship that exists between the lexicographical solution for crisp TU games and the least square nucleolus, a crisp value defined by Ruiz et al. (Internat. J. Game Theory 25 (1996) 113-134). Previously, and also based on this relationship, we axiomatically characterize the equalizer solution for fuzzy TU games. Both values, the equalizer and the lexicographical solutions, are based on the consideration of a measure of dissatisfaction of players rather than coalitions.- Project number: 229
Item Hacia la creación de una comunidad docente de aprendizaje en el área de la EstadÃstica y la Investigación Operativa(2023) Ferrer Caja, José MarÃa; González Ortega, Jorge; Molina Peralta, Isabel; Dominguez Dominguez, Cristina; Granda Chico, Bibiana; Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; González Ortega, Jorge; Caballé Cervigón, Nuria; Muñoz López, Susana; Alonso Sanz, Rosa; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio; Rio Moreno, Mario; RodrÃguez González, Juan Tinguaro; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio; Tirado DomÃnguez, Gregorio; Vitoriano Villanueva, Begoña; Yáñez Gestoso, Francisco Javier; Ortuño Sánchez, MarÃa TeresaEl objetivo del presente proyecto ha sido crear un espacio de reflexión y evaluación de estrategias didácticas aplicadas en asignaturas de EstadÃstica e Investigación Operativa facilitando la creación de una comunidad docente de aprendizaje en el área,