Assessment of groups in a network organization based on the Shapley group value.

Flores, Ramón; Molina Ferragut, Elisenda; Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio

Assessment of groups in a network organization based on the Shapley group value.

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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167923616000038

Publication date

2016

Authors

Flores, Ramón

Molina Ferragut, Elisenda

Tejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio

Publisher

Elsevier

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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/24464

Citation

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Abstract

The focus of this paper is the assessment of groups of agents or units in a network organization. Given a social network, the relations between agents are modeled by means of a graph, and its functionality will be codified by means of a cooperative game. Building on previous work of Gomez et al. (2003) for the individual case, we propose a Myerson group value to evaluate the ability of each group of agents inside the social network to achieve the organization's goals. We analyze this centrality measure, and in particular we offer several decompositions that facilitate obtaining a precise interpretation of it.