Person: Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Análisis Económico y economía cuantitativa
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
Now showing 1 - 8 of 8
PublicationLa Economía del Comportamiento en la asignatura de Teoría de Juegos: Experimentos en las aulas(2019-06-24) Camiña Centeno, Ester; Cerdá Tena, Emilio; Álvarez González, Francisco; Onrubia Fernández, Jorge; Sánchez Fuentes, Antonio Jesús; Rojas Candela, Ricardo; García Gómez, Raul; Salas del Mármol, Rafael; Moreno Martín, María Lourdes; Rey Simo, José Manuel; Rodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloEl objetivo es introducir la economía experimental como herramienta pedagógica en la enseñanza de Teoría de Juegos para alumnos de los Grados en Economía y Doble Grado en Economía, Matemáticas y Estadística acercándoles a un análisis económico actual. PublicationMaximal Domains for Strategy-Proof Pairwise Exchange(Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), 2021) Rodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloWe analyze centralized non-monetary markets for indivisible objects through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We characterize a family of do- mains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) such that there exist pairwise exchange rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Minimal reversal domains are maximal rich domains for individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy- proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common rank- ing but for a specific pair of objects. PublicationOn single-peakedness and strategy-proofness: ties between adjacent alternatives(Economics Bulletin, 2017) Rodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloWe extend the classical characterizations of social choice rules that satisfy strategy-proofness in the single-peaked domain of preferences by Moulin (Public Choice, 1980) and Barberà, Gul, and Stacchetti (Journal of Economic Theory, 1993) to multivalued social choice rules that admit either the selection of single alternatives or the selection of pairs of adjacent alternatives. PublicationSchool Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics(2020-07) Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo; Romero Medina, AntonioWe consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transfer-able student characteristics. In this framework, the tradeoff between efficiency and stability can be alleviated by forming fair Pareto improvements where a group of students may improve their assignment to schools by exchanging their positions and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned to without generating justified envy for the remaining students. We define the student exchange with transferable characteristics (SETC) class of algorithms. Every algorithm in the SETC class starts from an initial matching of students to schools and an initial allocation of transferable characteristics and proposes a sequence of fair Pareto improvements, until the point at which an additional efficiency gain implies a violation of the school priorities that cannot be solved with a reallocation of transferable characteristics. PublicationSchool Choice with Transferable Student Characteristics(2023-05) Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo; Romero Medina, AntonioWe consider school choice problems where school priorities depend on transferable student characteristics. Fair Pareto improvements can alleviate the trade-off between efficiency and stability in this framework. A group of students may improve their outcomes by exchanging their seats and transferable characteristics at the schools they are initially assigned without generating justified envy among the remaining students. We define the student exchange with transferable characteristics (SETC) class of algorithms. Every algorithm in the SETC class starts from an initial matching of students to schools and an initial allocation of transferable characteristics. The algorithms then propose a sequence of fair Pareto improvements until the point at which any additional efficiency gain implies a violation of the school priorities that cannot be solved with a reallocation of the transferable characteristics. PublicationAge-based preferences in paired kidney exchange(Elsevier, 2017) Nicolò, Antonio; Rodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloWe consider a Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) model in which patients’ preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older ones. We propose a family of rules, sequential priority rules, that only allow for pairwise exchanges and satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. These rules allocate kidneys according to a priority algorithm that gives priority to patients with younger donors and assign kidneys from younger donors first. We extend the analysis to rules that allow multiple ways exchanges and to the case of patients who have more than one potential donor. PublicationAge based preferences in paired kidney exchange(2013-11-01) Nicolò, Antonio; Rodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloWe consider a model of Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) with feasibility constraints on the number of patient-donor pairs involved in exchanges. Patients' preferences are restricted so that patients prefer kidneys from compatible younger donors to kidneys from older donors. In this framework, patients with compatible donors may enroll on PKE programs to receive an organ with higher expected graft survival than that of their intended donor. PKE rules that satisfy individual rationality, eciency, and strategy-proofness necessarily select pairwise exchanges. Such rules maximize the number of transplantations among pairs with the youngest donors, and sequentially among pairs with donors of dierent age groups. PublicationDeliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation(2014-02) Rivas, Javier; Rodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloWe analyse committees of voters who take a decision between two options as a two- stage process. In a discussion stage, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the leader, is more influential than the rest at the discussion stage even though she is not better informed. We study information transmission and characterize the effects of the leader on the deliberation process. We find, amongst others, that both the quality of the decision taken by the committee and how truthful voters are at the discussion stage depends non-monotonically on how influential the leader is. In particular, although a leader whose influence is weak does not disrupt the decision process of the committee in any way, a very influential leader is less disruptive than a moderately influential leader.