Person:
Pérez-Soba Aguilar, Inés

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First Name
Inés
Last Name
Pérez-Soba Aguilar
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/74715
Affiliation
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Department
Economía Aplicada, Pública y Política
Area
Economía Aplicada
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2017 - 201912020 - 20211
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Author: Márquez De La Cruz, Elena × Subject: G34 ×

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Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
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    Further empirical evidence on block transactions below the MBR: the spanish market
    (The European Journal of Finance, 2017) Pérez-Soba Aguilar, Inés; Márquez De La Cruz, Elena; Martínez Cañete, Ana Rosa
    There is a relatively unknown market for partial control or corporate influence in Spanish listed firms, where the control transaction size is below the legal threshold that triggers a mandatory tender offer, as this kind of deal looks for exercising some degree of control, but not a full control. The goal of this paper is to go further in its empirical analysis by exploring its distinguishing features, using as the criterion to define its transactions obtaining a seat in the board of directors. We find that these deals are mainly located in the segment of the market of large trades where the rules for private negotiations are easier to implement; the size of the block is relatively large and it is negotiated as a whole block. Besides, the most common buyer has no previous stake in the firm. We find no evidence that the buyers pay, in median, for a seat on the board of directors, but the variability of the premiums for those blocks is higher and shows that buyers that had no control position in the target firm pay more for being among largest shareholders (partial control) and less for not being among them (influence).
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    Private benefits from control block trades in the spanish stock exchange
    (North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2021) Pérez-Soba Aguilar, Inés; Martínez Cañete, Ana Rosa; Márquez De La Cruz, Elena
    A control block trade can be explained by the expectation of financial gains, shared by all shareholders, or by the expectation of private benefits, exclusive to the buyer and possibly at the expense of other shareholders’ rents. The market for corporate control contributes to social welfare when it improves the efficiency of the allocation of resources. When the objective of a block transaction is private benefits, social welfare may be negatively impacted as minority shareholders could withdraw from the market. Therefore the estimation of private benefits would allow the efficiency of the market for corporate control to be assessed. Specifically, the aim of this paper is to calculate private benefits in the Spanish market for partial control. Using a sample of partial control transactions over the period 1990–2016, we find that the median of private benefits is negative, therefore it appears that there is no inefficient use of resources in the Spanish partial control market as a whole, however private costs are detected. The variability of private benefits is explained in a significant way by variables related to the control structure of the target firm, such as the controlling position of the buyer after the transaction, the contestability of control and the cross-shareholdings between the buyer and large shareholders. Performance and the size of the firm are significant as well.