Further empirical evidence on block transactions below the MBR: the spanish market
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2017
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Pérez-Soba, I., Márquez-de-la-Cruz, E., & Martínez-Cañete, A. R. (2017). Further empirical evidence on block transactions below the MBR: the Spanish market. The European Journal of Finance, 24(14), 1224–1251. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2017.1359197
Abstract
There is a relatively unknown market for partial control or corporate influence in Spanish listed firms, where the control transaction size is below the legal threshold that triggers a mandatory tender offer, as this kind of deal looks for exercising some degree of control, but not a full control. The goal of this paper is to go further in its empirical analysis by exploring its distinguishing features, using as the criterion to define its transactions obtaining a seat in the board of directors. We find that these deals are mainly located in the segment of the market of large trades where the rules for private negotiations are easier to implement; the size of the block is relatively large and it is negotiated as a whole block. Besides, the most common buyer has no previous stake in the firm. We find no evidence that the buyers pay, in median, for a seat on the board of directors, but the variability of the premiums for those blocks is higher and shows that buyers that had no control position in the target firm pay more for being among largest shareholders (partial control) and less for not being among them (influence).