Person:
Mazón Calpena, Cristina

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First Name
Cristina
Last Name
Mazón Calpena
Affiliation
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Faculty / Institute
Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
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Area
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico
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Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
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    Publication
    Treasury Auctions: The Spanish format
    (2002) Álvarez González, Francisco; Mazón Calpena, Cristina
    The Spanish Treasury is the only Treasury in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell government debt: winning bidders pay their bid price for each unit if this is lower than the weighted average price of winning bids, and pay the weighted average price of winning bids otherwise. Following Gordy (1996), we model the Spanish auction as a common value auction of multiple units with private information, allowing for multiple bids. Simulations show that bidders use bid spread to hedge against both uncertainty and the winner's curse, and that the expected seller's revenue is higher in the Spanish than in the discriminatory auction in a number of cases. El Tesoro español es el único Tesoro del mundo que utiliza un sistema híbrido de subasta discriminatoria y uniforme para vender deuda del estado: los pujadores ganadores pagan su puja por cada unidad, si esta fue menor que la media de las pujas ganadoras, y pagan la media de las pujas ganadoras en caso contrario. Siguiendo a Gordy (1996), desarrollamos un modelo para la subasta española, como una subasta de valor común y múltiples unidades, con información privada, permitiendo que los pujadores pujen por varias unidades. Utilizando simulaciones, encontramos que un pujador puja por distintas unidades a precios distintos, para protegerse tanto de la incertidumbre sobre el valor del bien como de la maldición del ganador, y que el ingreso esperado del vendedor es mayor con la subasta española que con la discriminatoria en varios casos.
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    Publication
    Multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction: simulations for the spanish auction
    (Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), 1999) Álvarez González, Francisco; Mazón Calpena, Cristina
    The Spanish Treasury is the only one in the world that uses a hybrid system of discriminatory and uniform price auctions to sell bonds. In the Spanish auction, winning bidders pay their bid price if it is lower than tbe weighted average price of witming bids, while all other winning bidders pay the weighted average price of winning bids. We adapt Gordy's (96) medel of the discriminatory auction to the Spanish auction. The model is a discrete model of multiple bids in a multiple-unit common value auction. We use numerical simulations to find equilibria for the Spanish, the uniform and the discriminatory auction. Our results show that bidders in the Spanish and discriminatory auctions use bid spread to cover themselves against uncertainty, and that expected seller's revenue is larger on average in the former.
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    Publication
    Price volatility in the secondary market and bidders’ heterogeneous behavior in Spanish Treasury auctions
    (Springer Nature, 2016) Álvarez González, Francisco; Mazón Calpena, Cristina
    We use multi-unit multi-bid common value auction models with private information to draw empirical implications on how bidding behavior in bond auctions is affected by secondary market price volatility, implications that we test using individual bidding data for 88 bond auctions held between 2003 and 2007 by the Spanish Treasury. The main novelty of the paper is that we analyze the effect of volatility in bidders heterogeneous behavior within an auction. We provide evidence that, as the theoretical models predict, the heterogeneity of bidders’ bid shading increases with volatility and that, on average across auctions, bid shading and bidders’ profit also increase with volatility.
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    Electronic commerce, consumer search and retailing cost reduction
    (Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, 2001-06) Mazón Calpena, Cristina; Pereira, Pedro
    This paper explains four things in a unified way. First, how e-commerce can generate price equilibria, where physical shops either compete with virtual shops for consumers with Internet access, or alternatively, sell only to consumers with no Internet access. Second, how these price equilibria might involve price dispersion on-line. Third, why prices may be higher on-line. Fourth, why established firms can, but need not, be more reluctant than newly created firms to adopt ecommerce. For this purpose we develop a model where e-commerce reduces consumers’ search costs, involves trade-offs for consumers, and reduces retailing costs. Se explica la competencia entre las tiendas físicas y las tiendas virtuales, concluyendose cómo el comercio electrónico reduce los costes de búsqueda de los consumidores, implica un "trade-off" para los consumidores, y disminuye los costes de producción de las empresas.