Mainstream Macroeconomics in the Light of Popper

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Macroeconomics has been dominated over the last four decades by the Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) which implies that economies are inherently stable. REH is a key element of the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) macroeconomic model which has also played a dominant role in theory and policy analysis over the last two decades. We analyse REH in light of Popper´s evolutionary theory of knowledge and learning. We claim that the latter provides macroeconomics with an epistemological and ontological foundation that, unlike REH, takes full account of human fallibility and upon which economists can build a more useful macroeconomic theory.
La macroeconomía ortodoxa ha estado dominada durante las últimas cuatro décadas por la llamada “hipótesis de expectativas racionales” (HER) que conlle-va el supuesto implícito de que las economías de mercado son inherentemente estables. A su vez, la HER constituye un elemento esencial de la llamada “Nueva Síntesis Neoclásica” en macroeconomía que también ha desempeñado un papel dominante tanto en la teoría macroeconómica como en la política económica durante las últimas dos décadas. En este trabajo analizamos la HER a la luz de la teoría popperiana del conocimiento y el aprendizaje y afirmamos que esta última dota a la teoría macro-económica de unos fundamentos epistemológicos y ontológicos que, a diferencia de la HER, incorporan plenamente el concepto de falibilidad humana y sobre los cuales los economistas pueden construir una teoría macroeconómica más útil.
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