El trascendentalismo de la facticidad en "Ser y tiempo" de Martin Heidegger

Abstract

In this doctoral dissertation we explore a particular kind of transcendentalism in Martin Heidegger's Being and Time, the socalled transcendentalism of facticity. In doing so, we introduce a special concept of facticity. In his effort to radicalize Husserl's intentional correlation – the correlation between intentio and intentum that has been proposed since Logical Investigations as a kind of solution for the modern problem of transcendence – Heidegger focuses at what he calls 'factic life', and tries to draw a clear line of relation between Dasein and the thing itself as it appears. In this context, 'factic' does not mean arbitrary or finite, neither is it conceived as opposed to 'logical'. Factic and logical are united on the basis of a simple fact; the fact that things always appear with a certain meaning. Things have a specific logical character. This is a factum, and every factum has a certain facticity. Yet, if things appear to us always with a meaning, that is, if we see only this factum, the facticity of this fact cannot be something thingful [dinglich] or something real. Its facticity should have a transcendental character..