The category of possibility in Kierkegaard’s ethical thought

Abstract

The category of possibility plays a central role in Kierkegaard’s first and second ethics. The relevance of this category in the context of his first ethics is set out in this paper by means of an analysis of the chapter of Postscript entitled “Actual subjectivity, ethical subjectivity; the subjective thinker”. Climacus claims in that place that, for an existing person, the only actuality is his own existence, while his knowledge of his fellow human beings is always a mere transposition into possibility. On this basis, Climacus will explain why one should not judge one’s neighbour and will also state the conditions under which examples can play a relevant role in moral life. On the other hand, the relevance of possibility for the elaboration of Kierkegaard’s second ethics is shown in this article by studying two of the speeches collected in the second part of Works of Love. In the discourse “Love believes all things and yet is never deceived”, Kierkegaard denounces the distrust of those who do not believe in the goodness of their neighbour. Such distrust is the result of an abuse of knowledge, for all you can actually know is that your neighbour may be evil, not that he is. That is why whoever judges another is actually judging himself. In its turn, the discourse “Love hopes all things and yet is never put to shame” describes absolute hope in terms of openness to the future, i. e. to possibility.