Scientific understanding: no veritism without realism, no realism without veritism

Abstract

Scientific understanding constitutes one of the most firmly settled topics in the philosophy of general science. The most accepted approach within the debate has been the so-called “factivism of understanding.” Here, I show analytically how the latter is articulated through the acceptance of two interrelated theses: an epistemological—veritism—and an ontological one—realism. Recently, a group of authors challenged this line of thought by dissociating ontological and epistemological commitments. I examine these proposals, elucidating to what extent they fail in their attempt to formulate a consistent account of scientific understanding. I argue that if one wants to articulate an account committed to a truth-centered epistemology, one should adopt a realist stance; if one wants to formulate a realist account of scientific understanding, one should subscribe to a truth-centered epistemology.