Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked Preferences

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dc.contributor.authorRodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-17T11:28:28Z
dc.date.available2024-06-17T11:28:28Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractWe examine social choice correspondences (SCCs) -mappings from preference profiles to sets of alternatives- that satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity when individuals are endowed with single-peaked preferences over alternatives, preferences over sets are consistent with Expected Utility Theory, uniform prior probabilities, and Bayesian Updating. Leveraging the relation between SCCs and probabilistic decision schemes -mappings from preference profiles to lotteries over alternatives-we extend the results by Ingalagavi and Sadhukhan (2023, Journal of Mathematical Economics 109, 102912). In one-dimensional spaces of alternatives, only the union of two single-valued strategy-proof SCCs satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity. In multidimensional convex spaces of alternatives, only unions of up to two dictatorships satisfy both properties.
dc.description.departmentDepto. de Análisis Económico y Economía Cuantitativa
dc.description.facultyInstituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE)
dc.description.refereedFALSE
dc.description.sponsorshipMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)
dc.description.statuspub
dc.identifier.issn2341-2356
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://www.ucm.es/icae/working-papers
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/105005
dc.issue.number0224
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.total18
dc.publication.placeMadrid
dc.publisherICAE
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de trabajo del Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica y de Innovación 2017-2020/PID2020-118022GB-I00/ES/DECISIONES COLECTIVAS Y MERCADOS CON INDIVISIBLES/
dc.relation.projectIDinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MINECO// PID2022-138706NB-I00
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.jelC71
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD71
dc.subject.keywordStrategy-Proofness
dc.subject.keywordSingle-Peaked Preferences
dc.subject.keywordSocial Choice Correspondences
dc.subject.ucmEconomía
dc.subject.unesco53 Ciencias Económicas
dc.titleStrategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences and Single Peaked Preferences
dc.typeworking paper
dc.type.hasVersionVoR
dspace.entity.typePublication
relation.isAuthorOfPublication4b4dbd38-bad9-401f-ad44-455383770a5a
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery4b4dbd38-bad9-401f-ad44-455383770a5a
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