Triviality and solipsism: two problems in the metaontology of art and a goodmanian solution

Abstract

Amie Thomasson’s descriptivism and Julian Dodd’s revisionism are two outstanding opposed views within the methodological debate in the metaontology of art. In this paper, I argue that none of them provide an adequate methodology for the ontology of artworks insofar as they do not secure ontological accounts to play a substantive role in improving our understanding of artworks and the practices they involve. Thomasson’s descriptivism faces a problem of triviality, unjustifiably reducing art ontology to a trivial task. In turn, Dodd’s revisionary approach faces a problem of solipsism, being a methodology that does not ensure conceptual mediation between the ontology of art and artistic practices. Finally, I will sketch a solution for both problems based on Nelson Goodman’s distinction between entrenchment and familiarity of a predicate.