Mixed mechanisms for auctioning ranked items

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dc.contributor.authorAlonso, Estrella
dc.contributor.authorSánchez-Soriano, Joaquín
dc.contributor.authorTejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-17T08:57:48Z
dc.date.available2023-06-17T08:57:48Z
dc.date.issued2020-12-15
dc.description.abstractThis paper deals with the problem of designing and choosing auctioning mechanisms for multiple commonly ranked objects as, for instance, keyword auctions in search engines on Internet. We shall adopt the point of view of the auctioneer who has to select the auction mechanism to be implemented not only considering its expected revenue, but also its associated risk. In order to do this, we consider a wide parametric family of auction mechanisms which contains the generalizations of discriminatory-price auction, uniform-price auction and Vickrey auction. For completeness, we also analyze the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction which is not in the family. The main results are: (1) all members of the family satisfy the four basic properties of fairness, no over-payment, optimality and efficiency, (2) the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the corresponding value at risk for the auctioneer are obtained for the considered auctions, (3) the GSP and all auctions in the family provide the same expected revenue, (4) there are new interesting auction mechanisms in the family which have a lower value at risk than the GSP and the classical auctions. Therefore, a window opens to apply new auction mechanisms that can reduce the risk to be assumed by auctioneers.
dc.description.departmentDepto. de Estadística e Investigación Operativa
dc.description.facultyFac. de Ciencias Matemáticas
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.statuspub
dc.eprint.idhttps://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/63715
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/math8122227
dc.identifier.issn2227-7390
dc.identifier.officialurlhttps://doi.org/10.3390/math8122227
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttps://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/8/12/2227
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/7732
dc.issue.number12
dc.journal.titleMathematics
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.initial2227
dc.publisherMDPI
dc.rightsAtribución 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
dc.subject.cdu519.8
dc.subject.keywordRanked items auctions
dc.subject.keywordBayesian Nash equilibrium
dc.subject.keywordExpected revenue
dc.subject.keywordAuctioneer’s risk
dc.subject.keywordValue at risk
dc.subject.keywordEquilibrio bayesiano de Nash
dc.subject.ucmMatemáticas (Matemáticas)
dc.subject.ucmEstadística aplicada
dc.subject.ucmInvestigación operativa (Estadística)
dc.subject.unesco12 Matemáticas
dc.subject.unesco1207 Investigación Operativa
dc.titleMixed mechanisms for auctioning ranked items
dc.typejournal article
dc.volume.number8
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