The artifactual duality of architecture and its ontological implications for legal protection

Abstract

This paper analyzes the peculiarity of some architectural works being artifacts designed to on a par perform typically divorced functions. Like technical artifacts, they are primarily intended to fulfill specific practical functions related to our everyday life. Simultaneously, some of them are intended to primarily perform an artistic function as well. This artifactual duality involves relevant challenges for determining their ontological nature and normative issues related to their legal protection. The practical and artistic functions of an architectural artifact may occasionally come into conflict and its owners often decide to modify it for a better fulfillment of its practical functions. Architects sometimes feel harmed in their moral rights qua artists when those modifications are unconsented. As we shall see, the doctrine of moral rights strongly suggests ontologically categorizing architectural works as concrete particulars. However, the artistic function of architectural works motivates the view that they are to be protected by intellectual property law too. The problem is that the objects protected by intellectual property law are intangible entities that motivate their categorization as artifact types, which is inconsistent with seeing architectural works as concrete particulars. As a solution, the plausibility of categorizing architectural works as artifact types will be explored as an ontological account that may reconcile architects’ aims and intuitions regarding both moral and intellectual property rights over their works.