The rational inquirer: disagreement, evidence, and the doxastic attitudes

Abstract

The Rational Inquirer offers an original account of the rational response to peer disagreement in terms of a duty to double-check one’s initial conclusions and a permission to retain an inquiry-directing attitude of hypothesis towards those conclusions. This allows for a vindication of the competing rational pressures to revise and retain one’s original views that give rise to the distinctive puzzle of peer disagreement. Peer disagreement is conceived as higher-order evidence (HOE) that generates a genuine epistemic duty to double-check one’s initial conclusions. This stands in stark contrast with existing views that characterize the rational response to HOE in terms of doxastic duties to revise or retain one’s beliefs. A framework for thinking about the nature and norms of inquiry is developed. The framework provides a pluralist account of the aims of inquiry, a definition of double-checking, and a defence of the genuine epistemic nature of the duty to double-check. It is shown that while the duty to double-check is incompatible with rational belief retention, it is compatible with the retention of an attitude of hypothesis whereby two peers retain their initial cognitive leanings toward conflicting answers to the question at hand. A non-evidentialist and consequentialist view of the central epistemic norm governing rational hypothesis is presented, and it is argued the account on offer compares favourably with recent views that also appeal to doxastic attitudes other than belief and suspended judgement.