The Epistemology of Successibility

Abstract

This paper explores the notion of epistemic “successibility,” which I introduce as the inverse of the traditional notion of “fallibility.” I will argue that the very same results that are seen as bad news from the point of view of fallibility appear to be good news when you look at them from the perspective of the possibility of epistemic success. This shift of perspective, I claim, can only be obtained when, following Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s demands, we abandon the old philosophical “scholastic” notions of knowledge, truth, belief, and justification and endorse ordinary language, everyday life notions. In this way, we arrive at a new, optimistic epistemological approach in which we stop beating ourselves up about the possibility of being wrong and start to investigate the various factors that lead to situations in which we have reasonable, albeit limited, justifications for our beliefs and our beliefs are true.