Cognitive vulnerability, repetition, and truth

Abstract

Debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science have regarded fallibilism to be a central characteristic of our beliefs and scientific theories. Two antagonistic attitudes have arisen from this starting point: realism and anti-realism. I will argue that this dichotomy can be avoided by replacing fallibilism with the more neutral notion of cognitive vulnerability. Our search for knowledge is vulnerable for three reasons: (i) we can make mistakes of various sorts; (ii) we can identify our errors by improving our research methods and the quantity and quality of the relevant data; and (iii) we can express certain truths about the world. The first two points are relatively uncontroversial. The third, however, presents more difficulty. Nevertheless, by changing our theories under certain conditions, we can enhance the cognitive verisimilitude of our theories and the possibility of achieving cognitive success. The notion of cognitive vulnerability can counterbalance both realism and anti-realism.