La justicia conmutativa como núcleo irreductible: continuidades y tensiones en el proyecto intelectual de Adam Smith
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2026
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Ediciones Complutense
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Piqué P. (2026). La justicia conmutativa como núcleo irreductible: continuidades y tensiones en el proyecto intelectual de Adam Smith. Iberian Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 13(1), 25-33. https://doi.org/10.5209/ijhe.102204
Abstract
Este trabajo examina la noción de justicia en las dos obras de Adam Smith —La teoría de los sentimientos morales y La riqueza de las naciones— con el propósito de esclarecer las razones teóricas y conceptuales que explican la inconclusión de su proyectada ciencia de la jurisprudencia. Se argumenta que Smith adoptó de la tradición clásica la noción de justicia conmutativa, erigiendo las leyes que protegen la vida, la persona, las posesiones y la propiedad como un núcleo jurídico sagrado e irreductible. En La teoría de los sentimientos morales, la justicia se presenta como una virtud coercible y necesaria, fundada en la aprobación instintiva del castigo ante el daño; en La riqueza de las naciones, esas mismas leyes constituyen la condición necesaria, aunque no suficiente, del sistema de libertad natural y del progreso comercial. El trabajo argumenta que ese núcleo jurídico irreductible fue asumido, sin cuestionarlo ni fundamentarlo, por la economía política del siglo XIX.
Abstract This paper examines the notion of justice in Adam Smith’s two major works —The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations— with the aim of elucidating the theoretical and conceptual reasons behind the incompleteness of his projected science of jurisprudence. It argues that Smith adopted from the classical tradition the notion of commutative justice, establishing the laws protecting life, person, possessions, and property as a sacred and irreducible legal core. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, justice appears as a coercive and necessary virtue, grounded in the instinctive approval of punishment in response to harm; in The Wealth of Nations, these same laws constitute the necessary, though not sufficient, condition of the system of natural liberty and commercial progress. The analysis suggests that this irreducible legal core was assumed —without further questioning or foundation— by nineteenth-century political economy.
Abstract This paper examines the notion of justice in Adam Smith’s two major works —The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations— with the aim of elucidating the theoretical and conceptual reasons behind the incompleteness of his projected science of jurisprudence. It argues that Smith adopted from the classical tradition the notion of commutative justice, establishing the laws protecting life, person, possessions, and property as a sacred and irreducible legal core. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, justice appears as a coercive and necessary virtue, grounded in the instinctive approval of punishment in response to harm; in The Wealth of Nations, these same laws constitute the necessary, though not sufficient, condition of the system of natural liberty and commercial progress. The analysis suggests that this irreducible legal core was assumed —without further questioning or foundation— by nineteenth-century political economy.







