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A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility

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dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-21T01:31:24Z
dc.date.available2023-06-21T01:31:24Z
dc.date.issued1988
dc.description.abstractWe show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with some general comments about the nature of the incentive problem.
dc.description.departmentDecanato
dc.description.facultyFac. de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.statuspub
dc.eprint.idhttps://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/23117
dc.identifier.issn2255-5471
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttp://economicasyempresariales.ucm.es/working-papers-ccee
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttps://economicasyempresariales.ucm.es/working-papers-ccee
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/63872
dc.issue.number03
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.total15
dc.publication.placeMadrid
dc.publisherFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales. Decanato
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDocumentos de Trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/
dc.subject.keywordLindahl equilibria
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibrium
dc.subject.ucmMacroeconomía
dc.subject.ucmTeorías económicas
dc.subject.unesco5307.14 Teoría Macroeconómica
dc.subject.unesco5307 Teoría Económica
dc.titleA note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility
dc.typetechnical report
dc.volume.number1988
dcterms.referencesArrow,K., Hahn, F.H.(1971).General Competitive Analysis; Olíver and Boyd, Edimbrough. Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., Maskin, E. (1979).The implementation of Social Choice Rules. Review of Economic Studies, 46. Hart, O. (1979). "Monopolistic Competition and Optimal Product Differentiation". Review of Ec. Studies, Vol XLVI,pp 1-30. Hurwicz, L. (1979). "Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Linda. Equilibria at Nash Eq. points". Review of E. Studies, 46, pp 217-25. Laffont, J.J. (1984); "Course de Theorie Microeconomique. Ed. Economi. Makowsky, L., Ostroy, J.; "Víckrey-Clark-Groves Mechanisms and Perfect Competition". Mimeo, U.C.L.A. working paper # 333. Roberts, D.J. (1974). "The Lindahl solution for economies with public goods" Journal of Public Economics, pp. 23-42. Samuelson, P. A. (1954) "The pure theory of public expenditures". Review of Economics and Statistics 36 pp.387-389. Satteerthwitte, M.A., Sonnenschein, H. (1981). "Strategy Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points. Review of Ec. Studies. XLVIII. Vega, F.(1985)."Nash Implementation of the Lindahl Performance". Ec. Letter. Walker,M. (l981). "A simple incentive compatible scheme for attaining Lindahl allocations". Econometrica, vol.49, n° 1.
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