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A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks

dc.contributor.authorCastro Cantalejo, Javier
dc.contributor.authorGómez González, Daniel
dc.contributor.authorTejada Cazorla, Juan Antonio
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-20T09:37:35Z
dc.date.available2023-06-20T09:37:35Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we define the weighted serial cost sharing rule for the cost allocation problem.We apply this new rule to the problem of sharing delay costs in a PERT network. This rule belongs to the Core and is the Weighted Shapley Value for a particular game. Furthermore, we present a characterization of this rule and a polynomial algorithm for its calculation.
dc.description.departmentDepto. de Estadística e Investigación Operativa
dc.description.facultyFac. de Ciencias Matemáticas
dc.description.refereedTRUE
dc.description.sponsorshipGovernment of Spain, Grant Plan Nacional de I+D+i
dc.description.statuspub
dc.eprint.idhttps://eprints.ucm.es/id/eprint/16006
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cor.2006.11.003
dc.identifier.issn0305-0548
dc.identifier.officialurlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305054806002954
dc.identifier.relatedurlhttp://www.sciencedirect.com
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/50061
dc.issue.number7
dc.journal.titleComputers and Operations Research
dc.language.isoeng
dc.page.final2387
dc.page.initial2376
dc.publisherPergamon-Elsevier Science Ltd
dc.relation.projectIDMTM2005-09184-C02-01
dc.rights.accessRightsrestricted access
dc.subject.cdu519.8
dc.subject.keywordPERT
dc.subject.keywordSerial cost sharing
dc.subject.keywordDelay cost
dc.subject.keywordWeighted Shapley Value
dc.subject.ucmInvestigación operativa (Matemáticas)
dc.subject.unesco1207 Investigación Operativa
dc.titleA polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks
dc.typejournal article
dc.volume.number35
dcterms.referencesBergantiños G, Sánchez E. How to distribute costs associated with a delayed project. Annals of Operations Research 2002;109:159–74. Brânzei R, Ferrari G, FragnelliV, Tijs S. Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects. Annals of Operations Research 2002;109:359–74. Moulin H, Shenker S. Serial cost sharing. Econometrica 1992;60:1009–37. Shapley LS. A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn HW, Tucker AW, editors, Contributions to the theory of games II. Annals of mathematics studies, vol. 28. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 1957. p. 307–17. Tijs S, Koster M. General aggregation of demand and cost sharing methods. Annals of Operations Research 1998;84:137–64. Potters J, Sudhölter P. Airport problems and consistent allocation rules. Mathematical Social Sciences 1999;38:83–102. Moulin H. On additive methods to share joint costs. Japanese Economic Review 1995;46:303–32. Albizuri MJ, Santos JC, Zarzuelo JM. On the serial cost sharing rule. International Journal of Game Theory 2002;31:437–46. Estévez-Fernandez A, Born P, Hamers H. Project games. Center discussion paper series, Tilburg University; 2005. De Frutos MA. Coalitional manipulation in a bankruptcy problem. Review of Economic Design 1999;4:255–72. Castro J, Gómez D, Tejada J. The use of proportional rule applied to durations for slack distribution in a PERT network. Technical Report,2005.
dspace.entity.typePublication
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relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoverye556dae6-6552-4157-b98a-904f3f7c9101

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